TI released its financial report for the third quarter of fiscal 2025 ended September 30, 2025, with quarterly revenue of $4.742 billion, up 14% year over year and 7% quarter over quarter, higher than analysts’ forecast of $4.65 billion; operating profit rose 7% YoY to $1.663 billion; EPS increased 1% YoY to $1.48, above the market expectation of $1.39.
Among them, analog chips grew 16%, becoming the main driver of total revenue growth, and the embedded processing segment’s revenue increased 9% YoY; however, TI estimates Q4 revenue will be $4.22–$4.58 billion, below the prior average analyst expectation of $4.5 billion; this guidance, which is below market expectations, directly conveys a strong signal of pressure on the demand side.
Although TI has now adjusted inventory to an optimal level and has begun proactively slowing factory production to avoid excessive inventory build-up, against a backdrop of escalating global trade tensions and macroeconomic volatility, the semiconductor market is still in recovery but at a slower pace than in previous upcycles, which may be related to overall macroeconomic dynamics and industrial customers’ wait-and-see attitude toward capacity expansion.
Industrial customers’ investment decisions have become particularly cautious, directly affecting market demand for related chip products. As an industry “bellwether,” we will continue to monitor TI’s strategic adjustments and performance; a full recovery will still take time.
At the beginning, the global electronic component market was full of hotspots and became extraordinarily active. On October 8, the U.S. BIS announced that 26 entities and 3 addresses were newly added to the export control Entity List. Among them were 16 Chinese enterprises and 3 Hong Kong addresses, including Arrow China Electronics Trading Co., Ltd. and Arrow Electronics (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd., marking the overall inclusion of ARROW’s distribution network in the Asia-Pacific region into U.S. export control. The reason given was “providing key facilitation for Iran’s armed drone procurement network.”
However, only nine days later, on October 17, BIS announced the removal of all ARROW-related Chinese companies from the Entity List, which would take effect after its publication in the Federal Register, expected to be completed within a few weeks. A temporary license was issued as an attachment to grant provisional exemption, but the amount of exports, re-exports, or transfers approved for ARROW must not exceed 110% of the items transferred during the 120 days before the company was listed. The validity period is until February 14, 2026, or the date when BIS officially issues the removal notice.
Although it was a case of “rapid inclusion and swift delisting,” the main reason in the end was that BIS could not afford to hurt its own side; to protect the interests of U.S. chip manufacturers, since ARROW is a U.S.-funded chip distributor with a very large global market share, the BIS did not want to impact U.S. chipmakers’ shipping channels by cutting off supply entirely.
This incident also brought considerable impact to terminal and spot traders in the Asia-Pacific region. After the list was announced, some terminal clients began pulling in goods in advance to prepare for future demand, while some Huaqiangbei spot traders immediately seized the opportunity to create a round of “Golden September and Silver October.” The prices of certain TI and ADI spot single-source goods rose sharply over a very short period.
Recently, it has attracted international attention, involving technology export restrictions, control of dual-use items, and global supply chain competition.
On October 9, China’s Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued an announcement, bringing technologies related to rare earth mining, smelting, and separation under export control for the first time, and explicitly stipulating that products produced overseas containing Chinese rare earth components must apply for export licenses. On October 10, the United States canceled its planned meeting with China and announced that starting November 1, it would impose a 100% tariff on Chinese goods. Since the second half of this year, tariff frictions between China and the U.S. have once again pushed the bilateral relationship into a “tug-of-war.”
For reasons of national security, China introduced new regulations on rare earth exports, implementing strict export controls on rare earth products used in sensitive fields. This policy is not only to safeguard China’s core interests but also to prevent strategic resources from flowing into areas that may threaten its own security. Under the current China-U.S. tariff trade war, electronic components originating from China are expected to face high tariffs, causing most electronic component manufacturers to adopt various measures to avoid being caught in the trade dispute, such as relocating production to regions with lower geopolitical risks. Meanwhile, enterprises selling finished products to the U.S. are increasingly moving their component manufacturing bases to Southeast Asia and India.
TDK’s new plant in Haryana, India, will begin mass production of smartphone battery cells at the end of this year. MURATA is also setting up a production base in India for MLCC mounting processes, and may, in the future, transfer direct production and assembly there.
Against the backdrop of escalating global trade frictions, the combination of cost, policy, and trade environment advantages has made Southeast Asia the preferred choice for enterprises seeking risk avoidance and layout optimization. In the wave of global supply chain restructuring, countries represented by Vietnam and India, supported by trade agreements, cost advantages, and industrial foundations, are becoming an indispensable force in the global manufacturing landscape.
It is sweeping across the globe. On September 30, the Dutch government, citing the Supply of Goods Act, forcibly took over Chinese-owned Nexperia on grounds of “corporate governance defects” and “safeguarding supply chain security.” Subsequently, on October 4, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued an export control notice, directly banning Nexperia’s Chinese subsidiaries from exporting all finished and semi-finished products produced in China. After the announcement, Nexperia Netherlands drastically cut wafer supplies to China and shifted core raw materials to its Malaysia and Philippines plants. However, China had already ensured the independent operation of its Dongguan packaging and testing plant.
Following the countermeasure, European automakers such as Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz were the first to panic, as a large share of automotive chips—especially key components in new energy vehicles—relied on Nexperia, whose market share once exceeded 50%. Diodes, MOSFETs, and other critical components soon faced tight inventory, with spot prices rising 5–10 times, particularly for high-end automotive and industrial control chips, where price negotiations became impossible. In the short term, European automakers may face production shutdowns.
On October 19, Nexperia (China) Co., Ltd. issued an open letter to all employees, marking its official separation from the Dutch headquarters and the start of independent operations. This struggle revealed that in the global industrial chain, the side holding real production capacity and market demand possesses greater resilience. On October 24, Nexperia resumed supply to Chinese mainland distributors, switching the transaction currency to RMB. Currently, only domestic transactions have resumed, with RMB settlement required to stabilize the mainland supply.
In this still ongoing conflict, Nexperia has become a victim of geopolitical confrontation, potentially losing its largest future market. Without China’s low-cost supply chain, its production costs will soar, erasing any price advantage. In the long run, although Nexperia has deep experience in automotive-grade power chips, its technical barriers are not irreplaceable. Due to export restrictions, European and American automakers are urgently seeking alternative suppliers such as Pan Jit, Force-Mos, Pong Cheng, and Fuding, all of which have received emergency orders.
At present, the China–Netherlands standoff has reached a deadlock. The Netherlands must calmly return to the negotiating table to seek a mutually beneficial solution—further stubbornness will only lead to greater isolation and loss.
Hot Topics: Consumer electronics demand is stable; demand for automobiles and new energy vehicles has declined; data center demand remains strong but has slowed; and the industrial market is accelerating its recovery.
Here is the monthly spot market analysis report from UniBetter. We hope this practical suammary and analysis of the chip spot market provides you with some assistance and value.
If you have any questions or spot material requirements, please feel free to contact us by phone or email: info@unibetter-ic.com
Please indicate the source when reposting.
Follow our column for monthly spot market insights, supply alerts, and expert analyses. Don’t miss critical updates—subscribe now!
#UniBetter #SemiconductorIndustry #ChipMarket #TechInnovation #IndustryAnalysts
